phical system of the Middle Ages as it is formulated, for example, in the writing of Thomas Aquinas. For the same philosophies from which the geocentric system in astronomy could be derived, one could also derive the mediaeval ideas about religion, morals, and politics on which that " good conduct of man " was based. The choice of the heliocentric system would have disappointed this philosophy and had, according to the opinion of its advocates, led to disastrous changes in human behaviour, religious as well as political. We can easily observe that the same way of metaphysical and sociological interpretation has occurred in every period of history, whenever general theories could not be satisfactorily validated by purely scientific methods. We may exemplify this situation by theories of the 19th and 20th centuries if we consider sweeping hypotheses like " there is no ether ", " there is no evolution from monkey to man ", " there is no mechanical explanation for human behaviour", etc. In all these cases, we easily observe the tendency to investigate directly the plausibility of these hypotheses from the viewpoint of common sense. But we can also easily observe the influence of human behaviour which is ascribed by powerful groups to these hypotheses.
Mind-like Behaviour in Artefacts
ABSTRACT of Paper read on 13th November, 1950. This paper is not concerned with analogies between contemporary computing machines and brains, nor with much that has found itself entitled " Cybernetics ". Its purpose is firstly to examine the extent to which in principle an artificial organism could parallel human activity, particularly those aspects by which we " justify the inference to other minds ", and secondly to indicate some of the philosophical issues to which the possibilities discussed are relevant.
Familiar faculties of artificial goal-seeking mechanisms are briefly described, by way of introduction to a probabilistic reasoning-mechanism which, it is suggested, might in principle parallel all describable forms of human behaviour. For this mechanism, the meaning of a receptum is represented by a probabilityspectrum over a set of possible responses by the mechanism. These responses may be internal, directed to the alteration of an internal formal representation of " that which is the case ". This activity, it is suggested, distinguishes recognition from reception, in that the act of response by (formal) replication entails symbolic activity equivalent to the naming of the receptum.
The problem of abstraction is that of the naming of an invariant in the flux of recepta. It is suggested that if the elementary concepts of the universe of discourse are (and are symbolized or named by arousal of) the elementary component-acts of response, then the possession of an invariant mode of equilibrant response to a specific invariant., enables the artefact ipso facto to name the invariant under all its transformations. It is even possible for the artefact to discover and name for itself new invariants, by a self-guiding statistical discovery-process, and to generate new hypotheses in the form of abstractions from abstractive activity. Analogues of emotional behaviour, the weighing of evidence-prejudiced or otherwise-and other characteristically human activity suggest themselves automatically in terms of this probabilistic mechanism ; words such as personality, consciousness, and self-consciousness seem to admit of consistent interpretation in such terms. Choices can be statistically reasonable yet individually unpredictable in principle,
